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Chua: Chua on Ngai

Sianne Ngai, Ugly Feelings. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005. x + 422 pp. ISBN
0674015363.
Reviewed by Eu Jin Chua, The London Consortium, University of London
Sianne Ngai admits at the outset of Ugly Feelings that her book may be nothing more than a
"bestiary of affects," but as far as bestiaries go, this is a fine and fascinating one that contributes
to a burgeoning scholarly literature in what may be called the "affective turn" in the humanities.
(Other titles that come to mind include Charles Altieri's The Particulars of Rapture, Sara
Ahmed's The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Brian Massumi's Parables for the Virtual.) But if the
genus here is affect and emotion, then the particular sub-species of affect in which Ngai's book is
interested is that of the minor negative emotions such as envy, irritation, paranoia, or anxiety
(each of which gets a chapter to itself). There is even a hybrid beast here called "stuplimity"—
Ngai's portmanteau coinage to connote that particularly postmodern compound of numb
stupefaction and expansive sublimity.
Her corralling of such affects into a bestiary is by no means trivial, for Ngai suggests that these
mean and ignoble affects are indexes of social conditions of powerlessness and frustration:
"obstructed agency" is the term she uses. In other words, there are many things to feel bad about
when one lives amid—and through—the injustices, inequalities, and alienating effects of late
capitalism, and it would do well for us to pay attention to these ugly feelings as they appear in
cultural texts and artworks—and in ourselves—in order to diagnose such conditions. (In fact, in
Ngai's picture of things, these cultural texts and artworks are not simply expressing our sense of
ineffectuality and impotence, but also art's own sense of ineffectuality and impotence in a
utilitarian age in which the domain of the aesthetic is marginalized as useless and irrelevant.)
This is a unique and powerful premise for a book. Indeed, the implication is that "strong"
emotions such as anger and fear may have less to tell us about present conditions than the weak
ones that Ngai analyses in her book, for the unlocalizability and diffuseness of such emotions
perhaps correspond to structures and institutions and practices that operate diffusely and without
discernible manifestation—structures that may indeed be constituted out of assemblages of ugly
feelings directed toward oppressive ends. "[D]ysphoric affects," notes Ngai, "often seem to be
the psychic fuel on which capitalist society runs" (3). Sources of cognate ideas which Ngai
invokes include Paolo Virno's analysis of how disaffected emotions become themselves "the
very lubricants of the economic system which they originally came into being to oppose" (4)—
for example when insecurity and anxiety in the workplace foment competitiveness and hence
enhance productivity—and Herbert Marcuse's delineation of tolerance as a disposition that may
be repressive if it means weak passivity, ineffectuality, and an even-keeled acceptance of
received policies (340-42). (This last idea of Marcuse's is an example of the more standard view
that the strong emotions of negative critique—anger and revulsion at injustice, for instance—
constitute more powerful forms of resistance, which presents a problem for Ngai's argument that
weak ones may do so as well, a problem that she never quite resolves. More on this below.)
Ngai's approach yields many insights that ring true, often in relation to issues of race and gender.
For example, she points out that envy, a paradigmatic ugly feeling, can be an actual recognition
of social and economic inequalities—and yet our culture's tendency is to stereotypically dismiss
envy as a merely "feminine" affect and hence, in this prejudicial logic, merely trivial. Or else
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envy is dismissed as a purely subjective affect: "it's all in your head" or "you're the one with the
problem." This is an important point, for ugly feelings, according to Ngai, operate at the border
between internal feeling and objective reality, between affective consciousness and material
political conditions. This is precisely where their diagnostic power lies, but this power that
derives from their liminality can be tamped down when, as in the case of envy, they are too
reductively converted from one side to the other, from actual "polemical engagement[s] with the
objective world into [reflections] of a subjective characteristic" (21). Irritation, the subject of
another chapter, is similarly liminal, being an affect that applies equally to "psychic life and life
at the level of the body"; it connotes the epidermal and the psychosomatic. Ngai does a reading
of Nella Larsen's Quicksand—a novel featuring a protagonist prone to irascibility—to argue that,
in Larsen's story at least, irritation functions as an affective index to the chafing violence of an
essentialist logic that insists that the colored person should exhibit her ostensibly deep-seated
racial characteristics at the level of her skin. In other words, Ngai reads the irritation, both
physical and psychic, of Helga, Quicksand's heroine, as quasi-hysterical—her irritation is a
symptomatic reaction to the impossible demands of the logics of racism. In the novel, according
to Ngai, Helga tends to be only half-aware of the racist imperative to conform to particular
essentialist stereotypes; nonetheless, her body registers the effects of this imperative as physical
irritation. Conversely, physical acts of racist violence upon non-white bodies that Helga
witnesses but refuses to consciously register—such as a white man defiling a receptacle of
drinking water set aside for the black occupants of a segregated train—are converted into a
diffuse and unlocalizable psychological irritation.
In a chapter titled "Animatedness," Ngai points out that the concept of emotionality itself can be
racist when persons of color are stereotyped as excessively effusive or lively or zesty—this
attribution of surplus liveliness to the raced subject supposedly being a sign of his or her closer
and more authentic contact with the realm of nature and the body. Ngai analyzes instances of,
and resistances to, this trope in Harriet Beecher Stowe's Uncle Tom's Cabin, the animated TV
show The PJs, and Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man, all of which contain depictions of the earnest,
over-expressive, over-emotional black body, the excessive liveliness of which functions as a
spectacle for white audiences. Even more notably, Ngai points out a paradoxical logic in which
this emotional effusiveness of non-white bodies is attributed to both their ostensible proximity to
an unfettered state of Rousseauesque nature, and to this "body's utter subjection to power … its
vulnerability to external manipulation and control" (101). That is, this body cannot help but
express what comes naturally, as when Uncle Tom breaks out into his effusive sermons, yet, at
the same time this natural expressiveness is also the effect of a "ventriloquism": Uncle Tom
cannot control the way in which Scripture seems to speak through him, to animate his body like
a puppet, thus emblematizing the puppet-like powerlessness of persons of color who frequently
are heteronomously "animated" or ventriloquized via particular preconceptions, stereotypes,
voices from the "outside." Excessive emotionality here becomes the paradoxical index of a very
real subjugation, the sign of a racial logic in which rational (emotionless) autonomy is ascribed
only to white male subjects.
All the chapters and indeed the book as a whole are virtuoso performances in which Ngai
manages to pull together all manner of cultural references and theoretical apparatuses into the
service of her rich and complex arguments. Ngai demonstrates a great deal of skill in
triangulating the most astonishingly disparate texts in support of her theses: the ambitious scope
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of the book is dauntingly rich and wide. The arc of the chapter on anxiety, for example, moves
from Hitchcock's Vertigo through Heidegger's Being and Time to Herman Melville's Pierre, all
the while making illuminating links between these unlikely bedfellows. In all three of these texts,
notes Ngai, "the projective configuration [that] anxiety assumes becomes inextricably bound up
with the trajectory of a male analyst's quest for understanding or interpretation" (215). That is,
according to Ngai, all three texts show how anxiety is the characteristic affect of a certain kind of
male intellectual who desires to shore up his masculine agency. To put it in the briefest terms,
this is because anxiety, as in psychoanalytic delineations, has to do with the projection outward
of the repressed internal psychic irrationality at the heart of the knowledge-seeker's subjectivity
that would otherwise contaminate the rational objectivity of the knowledge sought.
Ngai is in fact particularly good on Melville, whose literary texts are touchstones for a number of
the book's arguments. As in her treatment of Pierre in the chapter on anxiety, she discusses The
Confidence Man in a chapter on "tone," and elsewhere deploys Moby Dick and "Benito Cereno"
as examples. And Bartleby the Scrivener, the literary character who is a locus for many of the
ugly feelings that permeate the Melville short story bearing his name, functions as a kind of
mascot for Ngai's book, given that the character's weak, barely expressed emotions have an
ambivalence that crystallizes many of the problematics of Ngai's arguments: Can these weak
emotions work as forces of dissent and resistance in the same way that Bartleby's passivity works
as a powerful trigger for unexpected effects in the bureaucratized world depicted in Melville's
fiction? Or are these emotions merely ineffectual—for, after all, Bartleby dies at the end of the
story?
One problem that couldn't be avoided is that the book's premise necessarily forces Ngai to
foreclose on the more unpredictable a-significatory aspects of affect. Her effort to argue that ugly
feelings can be diagnostic of material conditions and social inequalities (a very convincing
argument) means that Ngai has to instrumentalize the register of the affective a bit too much. The
book tends too far, I think, toward a conception of affect as a form of bodily knowledge that is
concrete and already meaningful, rather than paying attention to affect's unpredictable autonomy.
This is not really a criticism as such, for, in an explicit disclaimer, Ngai says that her book will
not engage with the distinction between "affect" (unstructured and a-significatory states of the
body) and "emotion" (affect already processed into structured meaning)—a distinction which
critics like Brian Massumi and Lawrence Grossberg are careful to make. It is of course Ngai's
prerogative to set the parameters of her study by focusing on "emotion" in this latter sense rather
than "affect" as such, but it is disappointing nonetheless when, for example, Spinoza is invoked a
single time on page 2 and then never heard from again. Spinoza's affectio and affectus might
have provided valuable contributions, reorientations, and counterpoints to the bases of her
arguments. For example, her implicit critique of a Cartesian theory of affects in which affect is
either psychologically inside the mind or materially outside the body, or her idea that negative
affects ("sad" affects, in Spinozist terminology) can be effective forms of negative critique and
political agency.
This last idea is another source of discomfort, i.e . that Ngai attempts to go beyond the diagnostic
uses of ugly feelings in order to argue that such emotions can also be sources for critical
resistance. In other words, Ngai wants to conflate the two meanings of "negative" in "negative
emotions"; she wants to move from "negative" meaning wretched or undesirable, to "negative"
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meaning oppositional or antagonistic (as in "negative critique"). The aim is to argue that
ostensibly undesirable emotions ("negative emotions" in the first sense) are actually desirable
because they are potentially oppositional ("negative emotions" in the second sense). This move is
a brave and much-appreciated one—after all, the book has to try to take its premise as far as it
will go—but Ngai has varying degrees of success with it. That is, it is counterintuitive from the
start to argue that affects which sap political agency or which index the sapping of political
agency can themselves be a source for political agency. The limits of this argument can be seen
particularly in the chapter in which Ngai tries to salvage envy as a potentially productive affect
for sustaining political—especially feminist—collectivities. Here, Ngai is actually rehearsing the
well-taken point that political collectivities must constitute and reconstitute themselves from
within in an always provisional fashion rather than modeling themselves against an exemplary
ideal. Such an aspiration is always doomed to failure, as when collectivities fall apart over the
question of who counts as a "real feminist" or a "real socialist," or indeed a "real conservative."
So no collectivity should have such a strict party line as to discount room for internal
antagonism—which is to say that a certain amount of negative emotion among its members is
required.
But why elect envy as the negative emotion necessary for sustaining collectivities? Surely there
are other affective dispositions that would work better to avoid the proprietariness to which
political coalitions often succumb? Ngai herself is quite aware of the difficulty here, and, in the
end, even seems to concede that envy doesn't quite do for her argument what she wants it to.
Feminist "compoundedness," she eventually says—at least as depicted in the film she analyzes,
Single White Female—can be actively strengthened through "disidentificatory and antiproprietary practices, if not directly by the ugly feeling [i.e. envy] that inspires them" (168;
emphasis added). Another way of putting it is that the book is too eager to conflate emotions that
are negative in the first sense ("negative" meaning undesirable or wretched or "bad" or "sour"),
emotions that are negative in the second sense ("negative" meaning oppositional or antagonistic),
and emotions that are just weak (low in power and amplitude). I agree that the presence of weak
emotions can be an index of actual material inequities, of powerlessness (tautologically, an
emotion without much power is a sign of powerlessness). I also agree that the presence of
emotions that are negative in the first sense (wretched, sour) can function the same way. And, by
definition, negative emotions in the second sense (oppositional, antagonistic) have a great deal of
critical purchase. But I'm not sure that one can collapse all three types of emotions together.
Emotions that are weak and wretched may indeed have diagnostic power, but not necessarily
critical power—and it's a tough job to argue that they do. Compare Paolo Virno's more
convincing choice (which Ngai cites) of the affect of "eagerness" that capitalist opportunism
encourages. Virno argues that an "eager" disposition is ambivalent and can be directed toward
more liberatory ends, since to be eager is also to realize that "our relation with the world tends to
articulate itself primarily through possibilities, opportunities, and chances, instead of according
to linear and univocal directions"—and hence eagerness, "even if it nourishes opportunism, does
not necessarily result in it." This example works precisely because eagerness is a minor affect,
but not a negative one—rather it has, as Virno writes, a "neutral kernel," and hence can
simultaneously diagnose oppressive practices as well as contain within itself the possibility of
resisting them (4; quoting Virno). Indeed, "eagerness" works as an example of an ambivalent
affect precisely because it is an affect, with a great degree of unpredictable autonomy, rather than
an emotion that has already been given negative or positive meaning. This is all to say that Ngai's
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argument about the critical potential of weak negative emotions stumbles precisely at those
points where she is most faithful to this premise, as with the chapter on envy, a paradigmatic
weak and negative emotion. I think that the burden of proof for this premise simply presents too
rocky an uphill climb to be surmounted. My reservations undoubtedly have to do, of course, with
my own theoretical predilections—I concur with Spinoza and Nietzsche in thinking that "sad
passions" or ressentiment-type emotions can't be effective sources of progressive, nonreactionary political action or indeed effective resources for living. Most of the time, undesirable
emotions are just that—undesirable, i.e. negative in the first sense of the term.
More successful than "envy" is the chapter on stuplimity—one of the strongest and most
fascinating parts of the book—which is a defense of the critical efficacy of modernist techniques
of repetition and senselessness, especially when these techniques are taken to such a deliberate
extreme that they generate vast emotions of tedium and numbness. Samuel Beckett and Gertrude
Stein are the most familiar examples given here, but poets such as Dan Farrell and Kenneth
Goldsmith, and artists such as On Kawara and Ann Hamilton, also get a look in. Kawara's One
Million Years (Past) (1970), to take one example, is a by now classic work of conceptual art
consisting of ten hardbound volumes containing a chronological list in Arabic numerals of all
one million years from 998031 B.C. to 1969 A.D. The work is also available as a recording in
which the epic list is read out loud by performers, and has even been performed live over the
course of several days. The "stuplimity" in such modernist and postmodern works—their
simultaneous sublime and stupefying qualities—leads to an "open feeling" (Stein's term), a "state
of receptiveness" that "depends on slowing down other emotional reactions, much the way states
of extreme excitation or enervation do" (284). And, Ngai continues, "while stuplimity offers no
transcendence, it does provide small subjects with what Stein calls "a little resistance" in their
confrontations with larger systems" (294).
This is a fascinating and largely convincing reading of the power of these texts as aesthetic forms
of resistance to oppressive systems. But the argument works here because stuplimity is a feeling
that functions critically not so much through its negativity but rather through its deflatedness. In
other words, stuplimity is weak but not strictly negative. Ngai's point is that certain modernist
aesthetic techniques are acts of resistance because of their blind and weak emulation or
affirmation of sublime institutional structures which one would otherwise be hard-pressed to
defy. The painstaking transcription of one million years in Kawara's work, for example,
constitutes a critique of the "administered society" precisely because it takes bureaucracy to its
pedantic extreme, deliberately "stag[ing] its own failure" (294). This strategy of emulation is not
exactly the same as oppositional negativity, though it is indeed "weak": it has more to do with
repeated gestures of obedience or affirmation to the point of exhaustion, to the point of
mechanical failure. "What might happen to a machine when the exaggeratedly obedient cog
within it, which continuing to maintain its function, goes limp" (295)? As in Bartleby the
Scrivener, this is a series of accumulated yeses that operate, effectively, as one big "no." Indeed,
the argument here seems to be one about the power of cumulativeness—weak actions of resigned
affirmation in themselves don't function oppositionally, but they will if you repeat them often
enough. Strong resistance emerges out of a weak acquiescence taken to a deliberate, metronomic,
parodic extreme. In this sense, stuplimity isn't even really weak in the strictest sense—it is rather
the strong, global product of many weak, local actions that accumulate progressively. Stuplimity,
as the reference to the sublime suggests, is a feeling of grandeur and vastness, and its efficacy,
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one might say, has to do with this sense of overwhelming vastness, not with puniness or
weakness or wretchedness. It can only function once it reaches, through a cumulative process, a
critical threshold of size and strength and power. A simple weak or wretched affirmation on its
own can do nothing. In this sense, the best thing about the chapter on stuplimity is that it seems
to be on the verge of proposing a way of rethinking negative critique—in certain circumstances,
it would seem, effective resistance may have less to do with oppositional negation than with limp
affirmations progressively building up into a kind of sublime, powerful agency. (And another
reason that the chapter finally works is that stuplimity is more explicitly a tactics rather than
merely an affective by-product of an intolerable, oppressive situation—I can see how one might
call for the promotion of a tactics of stuplimity, but less how one might promote envy or
paranoia or irritation as an oppositional tactics.)
It is telling of the sharpness of Ngai's analyses that, though she never resolves the difficulty that
she sets herself in attempting to recuperate the minor negative emotions for politics, she does, at
the end of the book, pinpoint the problem with penetrating clarity, thus opening it up for further
dissection. The book concludes with a chapter on disgust—a negative but by no means weak
emotion that puts into relief the stumbling blocks that the previous chapters had to encounter—
and in the final sentences, Ngai writes:
disgust does not so much solve the dilemma of social powerlessness as diagnose it powerfully.
But while all of the negative affects we have discussed call attention to this problem, the poetics
of disgust seems to have drawn us closer to the domain of political theory, perhaps even of
political commitment, than the others. In its intense and unambivalent negativity, disgust thus
seems to represent an outer limit or threshold of what I have called ugly feelings, preparing us
for more instrumental or politically efficacious emotions. It therefore brings us to the edge of this
project on the aesthetics of minor affects, marking the furthest it can go. (353-54)
As an analysis of how weak negative emotions may serve as diagnostic tools, Ugly Feelings goes
very far indeed. It is itself a powerful and illuminating diagnostic tool. As an analysis of how
such emotions may serve as modes of critical resistance, Ngai's "bestiary" of affects goes as far
as it can go—and it makes me want to see Ngai compile another (a sequel?) in which she turns
her attention to other, less intractable, perhaps more politically promising creatures.
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